

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

December 7, 2001

TO: J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: Matt Forsbacka and Paul Gubanc, Oak Ridge Site Representatives
SUBJ: Activity Report for Week Ending December 7, 2001

A. DOE Oak Ridge Operations - Environmental Management (DOE-ORO/EM): On Thursday, the DOE-Headquarters authorization basis (AB) review team leader (Mr. Chung, NNSA-DP) visited with DOE-ORO and Bechtel Jacobs (BJC) to prepare for his team's arrival next Monday.

1. The DOE-HQ AB review team consists of ten people drawn from around DOE but all from outside of ORO. The on-site portion of the review is planned for December 10-14, and January 7-9 (as necessary). The final report is targeted to be issued January 25, 2002.
2. The scope of the review is consistent with the Board's October 15 letter and prior commitments to the Board to conduct a review of ORO's "AB process." (During Mr. Chung's visit, it became obvious that ORO has no formal procedures in this regard and that ORO's AB review and approval practices are as varied as the personalities involved in it.)
3. The number of affected nuclear (120+) and radiological (170+) facilities came as a surprise to Mr. Chung. Faced with this large population, the team will only review select facilities and is depending upon ORO and BJC to prioritize them. Had ORO/BJC not conducted the review of November 30th (see prior weekly), the review team would very probably have wasted its first several days attempting to discern where best to spend their time. (1-C)

B. Y-12 Disassembly: On Monday, NNSA commenced their Readiness Assessment (RA) for the upcoming disassembly campaign. Key observations so far include:

1. During the first day's evolutions, a "belly band" lifting fixture was inadequately torqued thus allowing the load to slip out and drop (i.e., not a positive capture design). Fortunately, no one was injured. BWXT is still investigating but it appears obvious that the existing design cannot be deemed reliable until a minimum torque is established by test and proceduralized.
2. BWXT's actions to evaluate the lifting fixture issue at other facilities have not been rigorous.
3. During lathe operation, control panel buttons were pressed by a second operator and then the process engineer without the agreement, or even awareness, of the lathe operator. A similar instance occurred during crane operations Friday. Such uncontrolled actions can violate specific safety controls and appear inconsistent with DOE Order 5480.19, Chapter 3.
4. On two separate occasions, the load was allowed to swing into and impact the containment structure into which the load was being lowered. This lack of care has the potential to damage the load, tooling and/or equipment. (2-A)

C. Y-12 Building 9206 Pyrophoric Material Stabilization Preparations: The Management Self Assessment for the Building 9206 pyrophoric material stabilization concluded this week and identified 11 pre-start and 8 post-start findings. Significant among these was the absence of a corrective action plan for a finding from a previous review and the failure to implement plans to accomplish independent reviews/audits as required by the 9206 Operational Safety Requirements. The BWXT ORR is planned to start next Wednesday. (3-B)

cc: Board Members